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ESSAY

Bounded Legality:
China‘s Developmental State and
Civil Dispute Resolution
An Essay in Honor of Professor Hungdah Chiu
MARGARET Y.K. WOO†

I am honored to be part of this celebration of Professor Chiu
Hungdah‘s life and accomplishments. Professor Chiu was a scholar
and a mentor to me. Even after all our years of friendship, he
remained the respected ―Professor Chiu.‖ When I started out in my
academic career some 25 years ago, it was to Professor Chiu‘s
intellect and his extensive library that I first turned. At the time, there
were few Chinese law related materials available (primary or
secondary), which stands in stark contrast to present day, where there
seems to be an overabundance of materials (some accurate, but many
not). Professor Chiu was one of the first to have a comprehensive
collection of good and relevant Chinese-language law materials. If
the material was in Professor Chiu‘s collection, I knew it to be a
reliable source. And so, every Wednesday for the first year of my
academic career, I would drive from D.C. to Baltimore, park my car,
and come in for a day‘s research. Eventually, I also learned to bring
my ―bento‖ box lunch because each day at noon Professor Chiu, Mrs.
Wu, and whoever was working in the office that day, would sit down
around a long conference table in the library for lunch. It was a time
for conversation and advice. Through these lunchtime talks, Professor
Chiu became a friend and a mentor.
I also learned quite a bit about the Chinese legal system from
Professor Chiu‘s writings. In preparation for this conference, I pulled
out Leng & Chiu‘s Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China, written in
the early 1980s. Presciently, the conclusions contained in that book
†

Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, Co-Director of the Program on
Human Rights and the Global Economy.

235

Woo macro

236

5/22/2012 10:15 AM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:235

remain relevant today. In expressing caution about the future of
Chinese legal reforms, Professor Chiu noted that, ―[b]oth socialist
and traditional theories put emphasis on order over freedom, duties
over rights, and group interests over individual ones.‖1 This
assessment of the Chinese legal order remains as true today as it was
then.
I teach civil procedure, a seemingly technical area. But it is
procedure and the promise of regular and consistent process in
enforcing legal norms and a method to check arbitrary powers that
underlie the ―rule of law.‖ Free market reformers have long argued
that a predictable and consistent legal system established to support
markets will also inevitably lead to rule of law and a more democratic
state.2 A democratic state, they argue, promotes greater inclusiveness
not only in lawmaking but also in law enforcement.3 Courts are seen
as public places where citizens can adjust top-down dictates to
bottom-level realities, and participate in the shaping of norms
applicable to everyday life.4 The United States, for example, with its
historic distrust of government authorities, has entrusted private civil
litigants with the role of enforcing certain legal norms and civil
litigation as one vehicle in developing public norms. With this
broader public function for civil litigation, American civil procedure
developed to accommodate easier access to courts for individual
citizens and give great autonomy to parties in court to shape, develop,
and prove their litigation.5
1. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST MAO CHINA:
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS 171 (1985).
2. See generally SAMANTHA F. RAVICH, MARKETIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: EAST ASIAN
EXPERIENCES 7–30 (2000); Adel M. Abdellatif, Good Governance and its Relationship to
Democracy and Economic Development, GLOBAL FORUM III ON FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND
SAFEGUARDING INTEGRITY (May 20-31, 2003), available at http://www.pogar.org/
publications/governance/aa/goodgov.pdf.
3. See supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., DANIEL BUTT, DEMOCRACY, THE COURTS AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC
POLICY, THE FOUNDATION FOR LAW, JUSTICE AND SOCIETY, 3 (2006), available at
http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Butt_Policy_Brief%232%23.pdf (last visited Feb.
26, 2012) (noting the growth in a court‘s role in influencing and determine policy outcomes,
in areas ranging from welfare spending to environmental protection).
5. One of the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is ―to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
See also the liberal joinder rules, which give litigants the ability to shape claims and parties
in the litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 18 & 20. For a historical overview, see Whether the Supreme
Court Has Limited Americans‟ Access to the Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3–7 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger
Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf.
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To what extent does China challenge the above assumptions
regarding the public and possibly democratic role of the courts? In
recent years, China has experimented with participatory lawmaking
by opening its laws for comment and citizen participation.6 Similarly,
China has also seen an increase in private citizen law enforcement
due to a dramatic increase in recent decades in the rate of civil
litigation.7 But much like the policies it has pursued in the economic
sphere, the Chinese state retains substantial discretion and control
over the form and manner of legal development,8 not to mention its
control over legal institutions, including the process of litigation.9
The developmental state is characterized by deep state involvement
in economic development and, in the case of China, extends to legal
developments such as guiding major litigation and resolution of
socially significant disputes, even when those disputes are between
private parties.10 One recent mass tort case not only illustrates
Professor Chiu‘s prognosis that the Chinese legal system will
continue to put ―emphasis on order over freedom, duties over rights,
and group interests over individual ones,‖11 but also how the legal
system accommodates the state‘s role and the development of a
multi-track litigation system.
6. ―Laws shall be made in order to embody the will of the people, enhance socialist
democracy and guarantee that the people participate in legislative activities through various
channels.‖ Legislation Law of the People‘s Republic of China (Order of the President No.
31) (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Apr. 29, 2000, effective Sept. 1,
2000), art. 5, http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm. See also id. arts. 16,
29, 34, 58; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Comes to China, ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2006, at 5, 5–6, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/adminlaw/news/
adlaw_fall2006.pdf.
7. Huazhong Wang & Jingqiong Wang, Courts Hit by Rising Number of Lawsuits,
China Daily, July 14, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/14/content_
10102630.htm.
8. During the 2007 National Conference on Political-Legal Work, Chinese President
Hu Jintao told the assembled judges, procurators and officials: ―In their work, the grand
judges and grand procurators shall always regard as supreme: the party's cause, the people's
interest and the constitution and laws.‖ Jerome Cohen, Op-Ed., Body Blow for the Judiciary,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 2008, at 17 [hereinafter Cohen, Body Blow]. In 2008, this
policy was actively implemented by the new head of the Supreme People‘s Court Wang
Shengjun (王胜俊) as the ―Three Supremes‖: 1. ―Supremacy of the business of the CCP‖
(党的事业至上); 2. ―Supremacy of the interests of the people‖ (人民利益至上); 3.
―Supremacy of constitutional law‖ (宪法法律至上). See Jerome Cohen, Jerome Cohen on
the “Three Supremes” (Oct. 22, 2008), CHINESE L. PROF BLOG, http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2008/10/jerome-cohen--1.html.
9. See Cohen, Body Blow, supra note 8.
10. See generally Amiya Kumar Bagchi, The Past and Future of the Developmental
State, 6 J. WORLD SYS. RES. 398 (2000), available at http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol6/
number2/pdf/jwsr-v6n2-bagchi.pdf.
11. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 1, at 171.
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THE ARMILLARISIN A CASE12

In April 2006, shortly after taking Armillarisin A injections, a
medication used to treat gallstones and gastritis, patients in the Third
Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University13 (Hospital) in
Guangzhou City began to suffer from acute renal failure. 14 Qiqihaer
the Second Pharmaceuticals Limited (Qiqihaer Pharmaceuticals)
produced the injections, and Guangdong Medicines and Health
Products (Guangdong Medicines) distributed them under an
agreement with Jinhengyuan, another distributor. 15 After discovering
these patient injuries, the Hospital stopped using the medicine and
reported what they had found to the Center for ADR Monitoring, the
government entity responsible for monitoring the quality and safety
of medicine in China.16 The central government immediately created
an investigative team, while the local government gathered an expert
panel.17 The panel concluded that Armillarisin A injections had
negatively impacted those patients with acute renal failure and
neurologic lesions, agreeing with the Hospital‘s suspicions.18 The
Center for ADR Monitoring then issued an order halting distribution
of Armillarisin A medications throughout China.19
12. Margaret Y.K. Woo & Cai Yanmin, China's Developmental State and the Challenge of
Formal Process: The Case of Counterfeit Medicine, 49 SUP. CT. L. REV. 361 (2010). The
Armillarisin A case was litigated by Professor Cai Yanmin, of Zhongshan University. Much
of the information contained in the following section was originally published in this
previous article.
13. Id. at 363.
14. Id. See also Suspect Held as Bogus Drug Kills 4, XINHUA GEN. NEWS. SERV., May
15, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/15/content_4546421.htm.
15. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra 12, at 363.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Investigation Continues into Bogus Drug Maker, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV.,
May 15, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/15/content_4545842.htm.
Taixing Chemical Plant substituted Diglycol, a cheaper drug, for propylene glycol, an
inactive ingredient in Armillarisin A. Diglycol is a toxic industrial material that can cause
severe kidney, liver, and neurological damage. Duan Hongqing, et al., Toxic Shots Kill at
Least Nine Patients, CAIJING MAGAZINE (May 29, 2006), http://english.caijing.com.cn/200605-29/10008363.html.
19. Margaret Y.K. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 363. As I have described
elsewhere:
The Health Department of Guangdong Province formed expert panels on May
26, 2006 and July 12, 2006, respectively. A preliminary diagnosis was made
after a series of tests on each patient that had taken Armillarisin A medications.
On May 22, 2006, the Health Department made a request to the State Council
and the Ministry of Health, asking that more experts be sent to diagnose the
patients. The State Council assigned the Ministry of Health, the State Food and
Drug Administration and the Chinese Medical Association to the job on May
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On July 19, 2006, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and the Standing
Committee of the State Council concluded that Qiqihar
Pharmaceuticals had used fake pharmaceutical materials during the
production process.20 The government launched a criminal
prosecution, during which ―one of the defendants made the surprising
admission that Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals had bribed officials to obtain
a Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certificate.‖21 As a result of
the defective drug, close to 65 patients sustained renal failure, 14 of
whom died with one patient in critical condition.22 Reflecting their
dependence on the developmental state, parties injured by the
contaminated medicine turned first to the Chinese government, rather
than the courts, for relief. Responding to the clamor for relief from
the 60 injured patients, the provincial government formed a
coordinating team to mediate the claims.23 Eventually, the team asked
the Hospital to compensate the patients; over 40 eventually settled.24
While the course of this dispute on the surface may have
parallels in the U.S. system, there are distinctive differences traceable
to the Chinese preference for ―order over freedom, duties over rights
and group interest over individual ones.‖ For one, the almost
immediate turn to government-led mediation represents a continuing
emphasis on ―order over freedom,‖ even in light of twenty years of
legal reform towards greater legal formality.
A.

“Order over Freedom”

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing in the ‘90s, Chinese civil
justice grew both in greater professionalization of the judiciary and
greater formalism in civil justice with an emphasis on adjudication
over mediation. While ―[i]n the mid-1980s the Ministry of Justice

27, 2006. Together, they formed an investigation team, into which they then
proceeded to invite leading experts.
Id. at 363 n.3.
20. Id. at 364. See also id. at 364 n.4 (collecting citations).
21. Id. at 364 & n.5. See also id. at 364 n.6 (describing a Good Manufacturing Practice,
or ―GMP‖ as ―a monitoring system to ensure the quality and safety of products sold in the
Chinese market,‖ requiring ―manufacturing enterprises to maintain facilities in a good
condition, [with] reasonable productions process[es], consistent quality control, and a strict
examination system‖).
22. Wang Xiaolin (王晓林), Qieryao Jiayaoan Bufen Shouhairen Lingdao Peichangjin
(―齐二药”假药案部分受害人领到赔偿金) [Fake Medicine Victims Receive
Compensation], CAIJING (财经) [FINANCE] (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.caijing.com.cn/200903-10/110116934.html.
23. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 364.
24. Id.
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expected the courts to conclude no less than 80 percent of all civil
disputes by mediation,‖25 the expectation in the 1990‘s was for courts
to issue adjudicated decisions. Thus, the 1982 Chinese Civil
Procedure Code emphasized mediation as the principal method of
dispute resolution such that in conducting civil proceedings, the
people‘s courts ―shall stress conciliation.26 By contrast, the 1991
Civil Procedure Law emphasized adjudication, voluntariness, and
party autonomy in civil cases.27 With an emphasis on adjudication for
civil cases in the 1990s, there was also a corresponding shift in the
responsibility to gather evidence from judges to litigants and an
emphasis on party autonomy.28 In many ways, Chinese legal reforms
took on the patina of the adversary system and the independent civil
litigation process.29 Chinese citizens flocked to the courts and
litigation rates rose dramatically in the 1990s.30
But formal adjudication did not, according to some, provide an
effective forum for the resolution of the growing social conflict. As
the economic boom in China resulted in greater disparities in power
and income, there was greater social unrest, an increase in letters or
visits of complaint, known as xinfang (a method of petitioning
seeking relief from governmental entities), and also, for reviews of
cases even after final appeals to governmental entities and courts.31 In
2005, President Hu Jintao called for the construction of a
25. See STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 272
(1999).
26. Civil Procedure Law of the People‘s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Mar. 8, 1982, implemented on a trial basis,
Oct. 1, 1982), art. 6, http://www.novexcn.com/civil_procedure_law.html.
27. ―The aim of the Civil Procedure Law of the People‘s Republic of China is to protect
the exercise of the litigation rights of the parties, ensure that the people‘s courts ascertain
facts, distinguish right from wrong, apply the law correctly, try civil cases promptly.‖ Civil
Procedure Law of the People‘s Republic of China (promulgated by the President of the
People‘s Republic of China, Apr. 9, 1991), art. 2, www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/12/content_1383880.htm [hereinafter 1991 Civil Procedure Law]. Article 9, meanwhile,
provided that, ―[i]n trying civil cases, the people‘s courts shall conduct conciliation under the
principles of voluntariness and lawfulness; where conciliation efforts fail, the people‘s courts
shall render judgments without delay.‖ Id. art. 9.
28. ―A party shall have the responsibility to provide evidence in support of its own
propositions.‖ Id. art. 64.
29. Id. See also Renmin Fayuan Wunian Gaige Gangyao (人民法院五年改革纲要)
[Five-year Reform Program of the People‘s Courts] (promulgated by Sup. People‘s Ct. Oct.
20, 1999, effective Oct. 20, 1999) 62 SUP. PEOPLE‘S CT. GAZ. 185, Oct. 20, 1999, available
at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=23701 [hereinafter
First Five-Year Reform Program].
30. See LUBMAN, supra note 25, at 255.
31. See generally Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal
Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 103 (2006).
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―harmonious society‖ in an effort to stem this tide of social unrest.32
The president of the Supreme People‘s Court, placing blame on the
courts in failing to end disputes, followed suit and strongly
encouraged people‘s courts to ―mediate cases that could be mediated,
adjudicate cases that should be adjudicated, combining mediation
with adjudication, concluding the case and ending the dispute
concurrently.‖33 The message was that the ultimate goal is to end
disputes, preserve harmony, and adjudication is merely one avenue,
not necessarily the preferred avenue, towards the achievement of this
goal.34
While Chinese mediation remained commonly used for family
and neighborhood disputes, even throughout the 1990s reform period,
it was because they require the personal knowledge or understanding
of the local residence/mediation committee. By contrast, litigation
had been touted for arms-length economic disputes involving
property or commerce.35 However, in the recent turn to mediation,
the concern for stability has led to a strategy of government-based
mediation even for economic disputes and in particular, for mass torts
and collective actions.
Significantly, in 2006, the Supreme People‘s Court identified
selected categories of cases for enhanced mediation. These include
cases of great public interest requiring the collaboration of the
government and other relevant departments; class actions;
complicated cases in which the parties‘ relationship is very tense and
neither of the parties has a stronger case according to evidence; cases
involving matters not governed by any legislation; very sensitive
cases and cases of great social concern; and reviews of petitions and
retrials.36 Concerns for social stability have led the courts to return to
an endorsement of enhanced mediation, particularly for cases of
32. When addressing a high-level Party seminar recently in Beijing, Chinese President
Hu Jintao instructed the country's leading officials and Party cadres to place ―building a
harmonious society‖ at the top of their agenda. Maureen Fan, China‟s Party Leadership
Declares New Priority: „Harmonious Society‟, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2006, at A18.
33. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 365.
34. Id.
35. Aaron Halegua, Reforming the People‟s Mediation System in Urban China, 35 HONG
KONG L.J. 715, 720 (2005).
36. XIAO YANG (肖扬), ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GUANYU KAIZHAN GUIFAN SIFA XINGWEI
ZHUANXIANG ZHENGGAI QINGKUANG DE BAOGAO (最高人民法院关于开展规范司法行为专
项整改情况的报告) [REPORT OF THE SPC ON THE SITUATION OF LAUNCHING RECTIFICATION
AND REFORM TO REGULATE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR] (Oct. 30, 2006), available at
http://cms.npc.gov.cn:87/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=1&nodeid=1482&articleid=353
846&type=1.
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―great social concern.‖37 Collective actions and joint tort litigation are
now viewed as potentially destabilizing to society and discouraged
both by Chinese courts‘ refusal to accept these cases and the
imposition of stricter requirements for lawyers in taking on such
cases.38 Instead, for mass torts cases, mediation can take place with or
without the request of the parties and by governmental departments
rather than through the ―neutrality‖ of a formal court process.39
In the Armillarisin A case described above, the first course of
action was the formation of a government-led mediation group. The
mediation working group was composed of members of the
provincial ministry of justice, the public health division, the public
security division, and the letters and petitions division.40 Despite the
fact that the Hospital might not have been the party who caused the
injury, the group directed the Hospital to mediate with and, if
appropriate, to compensate the victims.41 This reflected the
government‘s focus on victim compensation, rather than
―adjudication of right and wrong.‖42 With these priorities in mind, the
Hospital had no choice but to negotiate with the victims.43
This bifurcated process (that is, steering major cases towards
mediation while allowing formal justice to run its course in run-ofthe-mill cases) has been utilized for other major cases such as those
arising out of the Szechuan earthquake and the Sanlu milk
contamination scandal.44 In both incidents, Chinese courts again
refused to accept the cases and instead relied on the executive branch
to step in to negotiate, mediate, and ultimately broker settlements.45
For example, in the Sanlu contaminated milk powder incident, the

37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Edward Wong, Families File Suit in Chinese Tainted Milk Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A19. Chinese lawyers had a difficult time filing a class action on
behalf of 213 families of children who drank tainted milk. The Court refused to accept the
case and instead encouraged mediation.. See also, Andrea Cheuk, Comment, The Li‟an
(“Docketing”) Process: Barriers to Initiating Lawsuits in China and Possible Reforms, 26
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 72, 73–75 (2008).
39. Cheuk, supra note 38, at 73–75.
40. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 366.
41. Id. at 366–67.
42. Id. at 367.
43. Id.
44. See Wong, supra note 38; Edward Wong, Parents of Schoolchildren Killed in China
Quake Confirm Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008, at A12; Chinese Court Rejects Parents‟
Earthquake Lawsuit, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/
2008/12/chinese-court-rejects-parents-earthquake-lawsuit/.
45. See supra note 44.
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estimated 300,000 injured victims similarly had their claims quickly
and quietly resolved through apology and financial compensation.46
The entire mediation was accomplished in less than a year. On
September 16, 2008, the state inspection services announced that
contaminated milk had been sold.47 In December 2008, the criminal
prosecution of relevant parties occurred (the former chairwoman of
Sanlu pled guilty)48 and on January 8, 2009, the Sanlu company paid
132 million yuan into a fund set up by the government for the victims
of the tainted milk.49
In total, the Sanlu families received about 200,000 yuan
($29,200) for the death of a child, 30,000 yuan ($4,400) for children
suffering more serious injuries, and 2,000 yuan ($300) for less
serious cases.50 More than 95% of the injured families have accepted
compensation of this type.51 Those who participated in government
mediation were denied access to Chinese courts.52 Chinese scholars
touted ―the completeness of this resolution: for the victims‘ families;
for the companies involved, which have avoided bankruptcy; and for
society at large, for which the disruption of economic and social
stability has been mitigated.‖53
Certainly, government-led compensation efforts also happen in
the United States. The U.S. federal government has stepped in to
resolve compensation questions in instances of mass disasters such as
the compensation fund established for victims of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and for victims of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.54
46. Fan Yu, Multi-Ways to Groups Tort Incident: Comparison of Sanlu Milk Powder and
Hapatitis C Litigation of Japan, CHINA NAT‘L KNOWLEDGE INFRASTRUCTURE JOURNAL,
http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-FXJA200902010.htm (last visited Feb. 29,
2012). See also China Couple Gets Payout after Child Killed by Tainted Milk, CHANNEL
NEWS ASIA, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific
/view/402860/1/.html/.
47. David Barboza, China Says Complaints About Milk Began in 2007, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2008, at A8.
48. See China Milk Scandal “Guilty” Plea, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2008 19:14 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk2/hi/asia-pacific/7805560.stm; Edward Wong, Milk Scandal in China
Yields Cash for Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at A10.
49. Edward Wong, Civil Suit Hearing Held in China‟s Milk Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2009, at A8.
50. China Couple Gets Payout after Child Killed by Tainted Milk, supra note 46.
51. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 367.
52. Id.
53. Fan Yu, supra note 46.
54. See KENNETH FEINBERG, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER OF THE 9/11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 3, available at
http://www.justice.gov/final_report.pdf (describing the creation of the September 11th
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The stated rationales for these funds have alternated between a need
to mitigate the economic impact of mass torts and to compensate
victims in the absence of an identifiable culprit. Ultimately, the 9/11
fund was viewed as an expression of national grief and, therefore,
unique and limited in its application.55 In most other mass tort cases
between private parties, however, the United States will typically
leave the resolution to the neutral forum of the judicial process.
By contrast, concerns for stability and social unrest have led the
Chinese government to take a more affirmative role in resolving and
mediating mass tort cases as an initial matter rather than allow
litigation. This is true even when the case is between two identifiable
private parties and there is relatively little economic impact.56 In
China, it is a top-down state policy of enhanced mediation for mass
cases. The resurgence and embrace of mediation, particularly stateinitiated mediation, can be directly traced to the Chinese state‘s
concern for stability and order rather than an individual‘s right to
bring litigation.57
In sum, while the 1980s and ‗90s saw the reformation of the civil
courts and the implementation of formal process, more recent
decades have seen a resurgence of mediatory justice.58 The greater
affirmation of adjudication in the 1990s may be a response to the
increase in commercial disputes between strangers due to market

Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 as part of a scheme to prevent the airline industry‘s
collapse in the wake of 9/11, allowing victims to receive compensation from the government
only if they agreed not to sue the airlines); Frequently Asked Questions, GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq#Q1 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012)
(describing how after White House involvement, BP replaced its original claims facility and
created a new escrow facility which, although funded by BP, is administered by a neutral
third party).
55. FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 78–79.
56. See Guanyu Jinyibu Fahui Susong Tiaojie zai Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui
zhong Jiji Zuoyong de Ruogan Yijian (关于进一步发挥诉讼调解在构建社会主义和谐社
会中积极作用的若干意见) [Regarding the Next Step Towards Litigation Development
According to Socialist Principals and Harmonious Society] (promulgated by the Sup.
People‘s Ct., Mar. 7, 2007, effective Mar. 7, 2007) 125 SUP. PEOPLE‘S CT. GAZ. 15, art. 10,
available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=106477 [hereinafter Next
Step]. See generally Andrew J. Green, Tort Reform with Chinese Characteristics: Towards a
“Harmonious Society” in the People‟s Republic of China, 10 SAN DIEGO INT‘L L. J. 121
(2008).
57. See Next Step, supra note 56, art. 2.
58. See generally Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory
Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25 (Margaret Woo & Mary Gallagher eds., 2011)
(providing a helpful analysis of this trajectory of Chinese legal reform).
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reforms and the need for more formal adjudication.59 In those years,
Chinese courts were given greater breathing space to decide cases
between two private parties.60 There were even nascent efforts by the
Supreme People‘s Court to reinterpret national legislation in order to
empower courts to deal with complicated civil cases.61
However, a more conservative trend has since emerged that
focuses on social harmony and stability. Chinese scholars and judges
are rediscovering the virtues of mediation, including its efficiency,
cost effectiveness, and humanity.62 The Supreme People‘s Court, in a
series of judicial interpretations, has steered particular ―socially
significant‖ cases towards mediation, with or without a litigant‘s
consent.63 Mediation may provide such harmony, but it can also
downplay the litigant‘s freedom of choice.64 And so, the preference
of mediation over adjudication in China is also a preference for
maintaining ―order over freedom.‖
B.

“Duties over Rights”

Where mediation fails, litigation begins. If the litigation is
―socially significant,‖ the Chinese state remains involved both to
shape the issues and to ensure the presence of the appropriate
parties.65 In the Armillarisin A injections case, eleven patients and
their families filed lawsuits against the Hospital instead of settling
their claims through government-sponsored mediation.66 The other
ten patients and their families refrained from the litigation, but
closely followed the ongoing trial.67 While the plaintiffs‘ injuries
were the result of counterfeit medicine, the Hospital was named as
the sole defendant in the lawsuit, rather than the pharmaceutical
manufacturer.68
59. See generally Benjamin Liebman, Chinese Courts: Restricted Reforms, 2007 CHINA
Q. 620; Donald C. Clarke, Legislating for a Market Economy, 2007 CHINA Q. 567.
60. See supra note 59.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See generally Fu Hualing & Cullen, supra note 58, at 48–53.
64. See generally Next Step, supra note 56.
65. See, e.g., 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 27, art. 119 (―If a party who must
participate in a joint action fails to participate in the proceedings, the people‘s court shall
notify him to participate.‖).
66. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 368.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 368. The plaintiffs‘ attorney explained to the court and in media interviews
why they sued only the Hospital. For one thing, Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals had already been
fined 19,200,000RMB by the Food and Drug Administration in Heilongjiang Province, and
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In response, the Hospital argued that it was not legally liable
since it had followed all appropriate laws pertaining to the utilization
of Armillarisin A.69 The Hospital also maintained that it was the first
to discover the problem and further, that it had promptly reported the
issue.70 Therefore, the Hospital contended that the manufacturers of
Armillarisin A, not the Hospital, should be legally responsible for the
effects of the product.71 For these reasons, the Hospital requested
permission from the court to join manufacturer Qiqihar
Pharmaceuticals, and the distributors, Jinhengyuan and Guangdong
Medicines, as defendants in the lawsuits.72 The plaintiffs protested,
arguing that they ―had the right of action,‖ which included the right
to determine which defendants to sue, and that both the Hospital‘s
application of joinder and the Court‘s decision to grant it therefore
compromised those rights.73 In an interview, the plaintiff‘s attorney
explained that joinder in this case would have negative consequences,
such as lengthier litigation delaying timely compensation to the
plaintiffs.74 In June 2007, however, the court disagreed with the
plaintiffs, ordering that the two sellers and manufacturers be joined as
defendants.75
The ability of the Chinese court to bring in new defendants
absent consent of the plaintiffs underscores the perennial tension
between the preference for substantive justice and respect for party
autonomy.76 The right of the defendants to join interested parties not
initially included a lawsuit is a situation that every legal system must
address.77 For example, in the United States, where party autonomy is
the persons-in-charge had been prosecuted. As a result, the company was not in a position to
make compensation. For another, since there was no direct relationship between the
plaintiffs and the pharmaceutical sellers, joinder of these defendants would lead to protracted
litigation and ultimately would not result in timely compensation to the plaintiffs. Id. at 368
n. 18.
69. Id. at 368.
70. Id.
71. See Cai Yanmin, Qieryao Jiayaoan Minshi Shenpan zhi Fansi (1)
(齐二药”假药案民事审判之反思 (1)) [Thoughts on the Qiqihaer Er Counterfeit Drug
Litigation (1)], BJ148 (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.bj148.org/fxyj/jaxl/qt/201109/
t20110922_160658.html [hereinafter Thoughts 1]; Cai Yanmin, Qieryao Jiayaoan Minshi
Shenpan zhi Fansi (2) (齐二药”假药案民事审判之反思 (2)) [Thoughts on the Qiqihaer Er
Counterfeit
Drug
Litigation (2)],
UNILAW,
http://www.unilaw.cn/Read.asp?id
=206 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Thoughts 2].
72. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 368–69.
73. Id. at 369.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 27, art. 119; FED. R. CIV. P. 19 & 24.
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strong and the plaintiff is ―the master‖ of his litigation,78 the plaintiff
may sue the wrong defendant or leave out certain defendants, and
only under certain exceptions can the defendant and/or the court
reshape the litigation.79 The plaintiff may choose to sue one joint
tortfeasor and not the other. The defendant‘s job is to deny and
defend the plaintiff‘s claim against it, and if necessary, himself
pursue against the other tortfeasor for contribution. The court‘s job is
to ensure a level playing field. As noted by Stephen Burbank, the
structure of American litigation is very much left to the parties,
particularly to plaintiffs, as to whom they wants to sue.80
By contrast, in China, joinder of defendants appears to be less
restrictive, less dependent on the will of plaintiffs, and more reliant
on perceptions of efficiency and substantive justice. This sense of
who should be brought into an action can override the plaintiff‘s right
of autonomy over the lawsuit. Article 119 of the Chinese Civil
Procedure Code states simply that ―If a party who must participate in
a joint action fails to participate in the proceedings, the people‘s court
shall notify him to participate.‖81 The rule gives the court discretion
to join necessary parties with or without request from the litigants.
When a defendant requests joinder, the court may also order it if,
after investigation, the court finds the request to have a basis.82
In the Armillarisin A case, the court concluded that this is a case
of necessary joint action and that the existing defendant, the Hospital,
had the right to demand joinder of the other parties, and that the court
could join the other defendants even without the consent of the
plaintiffs.83 Much to the parties‘ dismay, however, rather than
dismissing the case against the Hospital, the court maintained the

78. See The Fair v. Kholer Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (―Of course the party who
brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon . . . .‖); Stanley Blumenfeld,
Artful Pleading and Removal Jurisdiction: Ferreting Out the True Nature of a Claim 35
UCLA L. REV. 315, 316 (1987) (―The underlying notion [of The Fair], which is now firmly
entrenched in federal procedural law, is that the plaintiff is free to chart the course of his own
lawsuit.‖).
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
80. Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation: Curse or
Cure? 3 (Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 166), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/
upenn_wps/166.
81. See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 27, art. 119.
82. Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa Ruogan Wenti de
Yijian (关于适用《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》若干问题的意见) [Opinions on
Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People‘s Republic of China], 31 Sup. People‘s
Gaz. 70 (Sup. People‘s Ct. 1992) (China).
83. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 372.
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Hospital as a defendant in the case.84 The court reasoned that ―it
could fully adjudicate responsibly only if all of the possible obligors
were joined to the lawsuits.‖85
But it is unclear how the Hospital could be viewed as a joint
tortfeasor since it merely administered the medicine and was in no
way involved in its manufacture or distribution.86 Indeed, the
Hospital pointed out that the pharmaceutical manufacturers and
distributors were the real parties in interest.87 The pharmaceutical
producers maintained control of the counterfeit medicines before they
were used by the plaintiffs.88 The Hospital also noted that, pursuant
to Chinese laws and regulations, it is both the producers and the
sellers who were obligated to maintain the quality of pharmaceuticals
during distribution and the injuries caused by counterfeit medicines
were the result of the failure of both the producers and the sellers to
fulfill these obligations.89 Consequently, the Hospital argued that
under Chinese tort law,90 the producers and sellers were the actual
interested persons, not the Hospital.91 The court, therefore, could
have decided to dismiss the case against the Hospital.92
Indeed, it is only with a broad reading of Chinese tort law and
liberal application of Chinese joinder rules in the context of
promoting a ―harmonious society‖ could the court have kept the
Hospital in the case.93 This appears to be true, as in fact, the Supreme
People‘s Court has explained that, in personal injury compensation
cases, all joint tortfeasors shall be made defendants when the plaintiff
sues only some of them.94 Chinese scholars provided guidance on the
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 375.
87. See id. at 371; 374–75.
88. Id. at 371.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. See also Thoughts 1, supra note 71.
92. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 372.
93. See Green supra note 56, at 149–53. The author predicts continued favorable results
for plaintiffs as China seeks to emphasize protection for those less well off as part of the
―harmonious society‖ policy. Id.
94. Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruogan
Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释)
[Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Some Issues concerning the Application of
Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury] (promulgated by the Sup.
People‘s Ct., Dec. 26, 2003, effective May 1, 2004) (Lawinfochina) art. 5, available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3416 [hereinafter Personal Injury
Interpretation].
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joinder rule, explaining that a necessary ―joint action‖ can arise when
there are one or more claims involving common rights and
obligations as well as several parties who must initiate or respond to a
lawsuit together.95 A determination that the claims should be tried as
―necessary joint actions‖ may simply mean that the court cannot
adjudicate them separately.96 This is a broad view of ―joint actions‖
consistent with the approach of Chinese tort law, which emphasizes
both rights and responsibilities, rather than rights as either a sword or
shield.97
In the Amarmillarism A case, there are several further
explanations as to why the court kept the Hospital in the litigation.
The court may have believed that by joining the parties and ensuring
that all interested persons were brought into the action, the court
could better determine the facts, the responsible parties, and their
respective liabilities. In this way, substantial justice would be more
efficiently done, even if the litigation did not proceed in exactly the
manner as anticipated by the plaintiffs. Alternatively, the court may
have believed that the Hospital owed a duty to the plaintiffs, whether
it was a legal or a moral one, such that the Hospital should be made
answerable to the plaintiff. With either justification we see the
emphasis of ―duty over rights‖ playing out in this litigation through
the Chinese court‘s affirmative efforts to shape the litigation.
C. “Group Interest over Individual Interests”
Finally, the court in the Armillarisin A cases, having brought in
all possible defendants, proceeded to hold all of them liable for
plaintiffs‘ injuries.98 By appearing to impose collective liability rather
than determine individual culpability in its attempt to resolve the
dispute, the court‘s ruling appeared to go beyond the requirements of
China‘s products liability law.99

95. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 371.
96. Zhang Wusheng (章武生) & Duan Housheng (段厚省), Biyao Gongtong Susong de
Lilun Wuqu yu Zhidu Chonggou (必要共同诉讼的理论误区与制度重构) [Theoretical
Misunderstanding and Institutional Reshaping Necessary Joint Actions], 1 SCI. L. 111, 112
(2007).
97. George W. Conk, A New Tort Code Emerges in China: An Introduction to the
Discussion With a Translation of Chapter 8 – Tort Liability, of the Official Discussion Draft
of the Proposed Revised Civil Code of the People‟s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT‘L L.
J. 935, 940 (2007).
98. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.
99. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.
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As discussed above, Chinese products liability law imposes the
burden on the pharmaceutical manufacturer and distributors to prove
that they had carried out their responsibilities regarding Armillarisin
A. Article 41 the 2000 Product Quality Law specifies that
manufacturers are liable for injuries caused by defective products
unless they can prove one of the following: 1) they did not put the
defective product into circulation; 2) defects later found did not exist
at the time the product was put into circulation; or 3) the defects
could not have been detected at the time of their release due to
scientific or technological reasons.100 Meanwhile, Article 42 of the
same act provides that sellers will be liable for injury caused by
defective products unless they can prove: 1) they are not at fault for
the damages caused by the defective goods; and 2) they can identify
the manufacturer and other suppliers of the product.101 Finally,
Article 35 of the Pharmaceutical Administration Regulations requires
that ―a pharmaceutical wholesale enterprise perform a quality
examination on medicines purchased for the first time from a
pharmaceutical producer.‖102
In the Armillarisin A case, the manufacturer (Qiqihar
Pharmaceuticals) did not respond to the lawsuit or appear in court, let
alone provide evidence that the company had satisfied the
requirements of Article 41.103 The distributor, Jinhengyuan, which
bought the medicine directly from Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals, admitted
in court that because of inexperience, it did not conduct a quality
inspection of the medicine.104 The other distributor, Guangdong
Medicines, signed a sales contract with Jinhengyuan but received the
medicine directly from Qiqihar, and admitted that upon receipt it only
examined such items as outer packages and sale documents.105
As could be expected, the court found the manufacturer, Qiqihar
Pharmaceuticals, liable for failing to satisfy the requirements of
Article 41 of the Product Liability Law, and the distributors,
Jinhengyuan and Guangdong Medicines, liable as wholesale
100. Product Quality Law (2000 Amendment) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l
People‘s Cong., Feb. 22, 1993, effective, Sept. 1, 1993), art. 41, http://www.bjkw.gov.cn/
n244495/n244634/2658335.html [hereinafter Product Quality Law].
101. Id. art. 42.
102. Yaopin Guanli Fa (药品管理法) [Law on Pharmaceutical Administration]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Feb. 28, 2001, effective Dec. 1,
2001), art. 35, http://www.sda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0064/23396.html.
103. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.
104. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.
105. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.
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enterprises for failing to conduct proper examinations on the
medicine.106 The court believed that, if the manufacturer or the
distributor had carried out its responsibilities of quality control, the
counterfeit medicine would never have entered the market or gone
into the Hospital.107
The Hospital maintained that it did not have the same
responsibility for quality control as that prescribed to the
manufacturer and the distributors.108 Instead, the Hospital argued that
its only obligation was to abide by the administrative regulations for
public bidding but since Guangdong Medicine had won the public
bidding for Armillarisin A organized by the provincial government,
all hospitals within the province were forced to purchase the
medicine from Guangdong Medicine.109
The court rejected the Hospital‘s argument and instead, imposed
joint liability on the Hospital, together with the manufacturer and
distributors.110 It was unclear what action taken by the Hospital could
be pinpointed to as unlawful or so closely connected to the
manufacturer and distributor‘s actions as to constitute liability. The
court subsequently explained that the Hospital was held liable
because the Hospital constitutes a ―seller‖ and therefore bears faultbased liability. In the alternative, the Hospital was also held under
―strict liability‖ or no-fault liability under the General Principles of
the Civil Code.111 The Hospital, however, pointed out that the
General Principles of the Civil Code only provides for ―strict
liability‖ liability if the underlying substantive law so specified, (that
―civil liability shall be borned [sic] even in the absence of fault, if the
law so stipulates,‖) and the Products Quality Law places
responsibility on sellers only for the defects they cause.112 Here, the
Hospital argued that ―strict liability‖ did not apply, that it did not
cause any defects, and that it should not be held liable.113

106. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 373.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 374.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 375.
111. General Principles of the Civil Law of the People‘s Republic of China, (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art.
106, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383941.htm.
112. See Product Quality Law, supra note 100, arts. 30–31 (emphasis added).
113. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.
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Yet, the court‘s imposition of liability on the Hospital may
nevertheless be consistent with how Chinese courts have interpreted
Chinese substantive tort law, and with broad collective liability. In
―Interpretation of the Supreme People‘s Court of Some Issues
Concerning the Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on
Compensation for Personal Injury,‖ the Supreme People‘s Court has
specified that liability shall be imposed if the ―injurious acts are
directly combined and result in the same injury consequence even if
there is no joint intent or joint negligence.‖ 114 This same opinion also
made clear that
where two or more persons have no joint intent or joint
negligence, but separately commit several acts that are
indirectly combined and result in the same injury, they shall
bear corresponding compensation liabilities respectively in
appropriate proportions upon the extent of their faults.115
In holding the Hospital liable, the court in the Armillarisin A
case must have concluded that either the acts of all four defendants
combined to produce a single injury to each plaintiff or that the
defendants‘ separate acts were so closely connected that it was
impossible to ascertain what share of the damage each defendant
inflicted. But if the Hospital‘s sole role was to apply the injections as
instructed, the court could have viewed that service as a separate act
distinct from the manufacturer or seller‘s liability. The court could
have declined to hold the Hospital liable, or at least only hold the
Hospital responsible for its respective portion of liability.
Significantly, even the plaintiffs admitted in court that they never
blamed the Hospital for the medical services received and that their
claim was one based on the infringement of product quality.116 It is
only by reading broad collective liability into Chinese tort law and
applying that liability liberally that the court could hold the Hospital
liable.
Finally, one additional factor may have affected the court‘s
ruling on liability. Given the criminal prosecution of the
manufacturer and the relatively small size of the distributor and seller
companies, the Hospital was the sole defendant financially able to
provide relief to the plaintiffs.117 The court‘s ruling could thus be
114.
115.
116.
117.

Personal Injury Interpretation, supra note 94, art. 3.
Id.
Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 375.
Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.
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seen as an attempt to provide redistributive and substantive justice for
the injured plaintiffs.118 It may also reflect a sense of group
obligation, and the concern of providing group relief for these
plaintiffs, over and above the sense of individual liability. 119 And so,
it can still be said that Chinese law emphasizes ―order over freedom,
duties over rights, and group interests over individual ones.‖
II. THE PATH OF CHINESE LEGAL REFORMS
Even as Chinese law continues to emphasize ―order over
freedom, duties over rights, and group interests over individual
ones,‖120 the inquiry cannot end there. Equally important, one must
ask who is defining the nature of this ―order over freedom,‖ the
identity of which ―duties‖ should prevail over which ―rights,‖ and
what ―group interests‖ override ―individual ones.‖ The answer for
China is inevitably the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).121 To
understand legal reform in China, one must take into account the role
of the CCP as the driving force for the Chinese developmental state
and how its involvement in legal reforms has resulted in the latest
turn—one that establishes a multi-track litigation system, in which
minor and relatively insignificant cases are mediated, commercial
cases are adjudicated, and mass cases are carefully controlled and
shaped by the Chinese state (as exemplified by the Amarillarism A
litigation).122 The most recent discussions on the amendments to the
Chinese procedural codes reveal efforts to codify just such a strategy.
This multi-track strategy to civil litigation is yet the latest phase
in the history of Chinese legal reform. One could even say that it is a
response to deficiencies created by the privatization of the legal
profession coupled with greater formality.123 As discussed earlier, for
a time in the mid-1990s, the Chinese state encouraged the use of the
courts in the hopes that the courts could assist in stabilizing society
118. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 375.
119. See generally Green, supra note 56.
120. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 1, at 171.
121. In December 2007, Chinese president Hu Jintao urged the judiciary to subordinate
the written law to the interests of the CCP and the maintenance of ―social stability:‖ ‖In their
work, the grand judges and grand procurators shall always regard as supreme the party's
cause, the people's interest and the constitution and laws.‖ See Cohen, Body Blow, supra
note 8.
122. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
123. See Sida Liu, With or Without the Law: The Changing Meaning of Ordinary Legal
Work in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
supra note 58, at 234–69 (providing a useful discussion of the growth of legal technocracy in
China).
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and serve as a neutral forum for litigants trying to rein in local
bureaucrats.124 Speaking at the landmark national civil justice
conference held between December 1978 and January 1979, Jiang
Hua, the former President of the Supreme People‘s Court, spoke of
the necessity and legitimacy of civil justice, positioned the Supreme
People‘s Court to take the lead in judicial administration, and started
to assert the Supreme People‘s Court‘s institutional autonomy.125
After the conference, Chinese legal reformers enhanced their efforts
at procedural and institutional change while the Supreme People‘s
Court decreed that Chinese courts should ―further improve the work
of trying civil cases, protect the civil rights and interests of citizens
and legal persons according to the law, and promote the just, safe,
civilized, and healthy development of society.‖126
For the next twenty years, China was determined to develop a
professional legal system, leaving the particular design of civil justice
to the expertise of the judiciary.127 More law schools were established
and qualifications for both lawyers and judges were both
strengthened and clarified.128 In a series of Five Year Plans, the
Supreme People‘s Court reduced the inquisitorial and investigative
role of judges while simultaneously increasing the responsibility of
parties to produce evidence and prove their case.129 During this
period, Chinese judicial reformers urged the development of civil
courts that would play a more general, public, and normative role in
applying and proclaiming rules.130 Yet, in many ways, such efforts
limited citizen‘s empowerment even as they added to it. Legal
markets created great disparities in the availability of legal services
between rich and poor; formal procedures increased the alienation
124. Ren Jianxin (任建新), Supreme People‘s Court President, Address before the Fourth
Session of the Eighth National People‘s Congress (Mar. 12, 1996), in BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 9, 1996, at 26; Renmin Ribao (人民日报) [China Daily], Mar.
14, 1997.
125. See Minshi Shenpan Gongzuo Tongdeng Zongyao (民事审判工作同等重要) [Civil
Justice is Equally Important], SINA (Aug. 14, 2007), http://book.sina.com.cn/nzt/history/
cha/jianghuaz/66.shtml, cited in Hualing Fu, Access to Justice in China: Potential, Limits
and Alternatives, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA,
supra note 58, at 25.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., First Five-Year Reform Program, supra note 29.
128. See generally Liebman, supra note 59.
129. See Second Five-Year Reform Program for the People's Courts (2004-2008) (CECC
Partial Translation), CONG.-EXEC.COMM‘N ON CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtual
Acad/index.phpd?showsingle=38564 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Second FiveYear Reform Program].
130. See generally Liebman, supra note 59.
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and burdens of poor litigants such that they were unable to access the
judicial system.131
Facing pressure from the international community as well as the
needs of a market economy, the Chinese state had applied market
principles to the provision of legal services. But in the short run, the
creation of a legal market has not led to greater access to justice.
While China now has more than 15,888 law firms with 155,457 fulltime lawyers, or one lawyer for every 8,586 people,132 fully 85
percent of licensed lawyers work in large or medium sized cities,
leaving only a small percentage to serve the vast population in rural
areas.133 Equally problematic, lawyers are unevenly distributed, not
only with more lawyers in the cities than in the countryside, but also
in the matters they handle.134 Lawyers tend to enter the more
lucrative areas of commerce rather than the less lucrative areas of
family law, debt, and employment.135 With the latter being areas of
greatest concern to ordinary citizens, there exists a tremendous gap in
the availability of services between the urban rich and the rural poor.
Similar resource disparities exist within the Chinese courts. The
different levels of economic development among the provinces are
reflected in the disparate resources provided to judges and local
courts.136 Until recently, local governments, rather than the central
government, appointed and paid Chinese judges, subjecting Chinese
courts to the whims of local government budgets. Poor provinces
with limited resources, such as Hubei, Guizhou, and Sichuan, even
lacked physical court facilities and faced shortages of judicial

131. See, e.g., Margaret Y.K. Woo, Christopher Day & Joel Hugenberger, Migrant‟s
Access to Civil Justice, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L L. REV. 167 (2007).
132. 22-6 Basic Statistics on Lawyers, Notarization and Mediation, CHINA STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/html/W2206e.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2012). See also Geoffrey A. Fowler, Sky Canaves, & Juliet Ye, Chinese Seek a Day in
Court: With New Faith in Rule of Law, More Citizens File Suits, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2008,
at A12; China Has More Than 143,000 Lawyers, PEOPLE‘S DAILY ONLINE., Apr. 16, 2008,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6393774.html..
133. Fu Hualing, Access to Justice in China: Potentials, Limits, and Alternatives, in
LEGAL REFORMS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM: A COMPARISON OF ASIAN COMMUNIST REGIMES
163, 167 (John Gillespie & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2010).
134. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA‘S LONG MARCH TOWARDS RULE OF LAW 362 (2002).
135. Id.
136. Linchun Zhang (张林春), Zhongguo Zhongxibu Diqu Sifa Jigou Rencai Liushi
Wenti Yanzhong (中国中西部地区司法机构人才流失问题严重) [The Serious Problem of
Personnel Loss in Judicial Institutions in Central and Western Regions], XINHUA WANG
[XINHUA NET] (Mar. 12, 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/200603/12/content
_4295068.htm.

Woo macro

256

5/22/2012 10:15 AM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:235

manpower.137 Recognizing this disparity of resources between
different provinces, the Chinese state has recently begun efforts to
distribute funds directly from the central government budget.138 Until
that reform is fully implemented, however, judicial resources are still
deficient in many provinces.
This scarcity of lawyers and judges proved to be a huge problem
particularly as China increasingly formalized its litigation procedures.
In an effort to ―modernize‖ and to alleviate the burgeoning workload
of Chinese judges, the Chinese state moved away from a civil law
inquisitorial system toward rules that relieve Chinese judges from the
burden of investigation and impose on litigants the burden of coming
forward with evidence.139 Absent the assistance of judges to
investigate and gather evidence, poor litigants need legal
representation more than ever and without it, are at the mercy of
litigants with greater economic resources.
Due to all of the above factors—a lack of lawyers, a lack of
judges and an increased burden on unrepresented litigants, public
discontent with the courts has mounted.140 Grievance petitions filed
with the Chinese state have skyrocketed: many of these petitions deal
with litigants dissatisfied with court treatment.141 In a number of
areas, we are seeing the next phase of Chinese legal reforms as the
Chinese state tightens its control over the courts and over the process
of civil litigation. This can be seen in the latest set of proposed
amendments to the Chinese Civil Procedure Code.
137. Id. See also Daibiao Suo Weidong Weiyuan Chen Zhilun tan Falü Rencai Duiwu
Jianshe
(代表索维东委员陈智伦谈法律人才队伍建设)
[Representatives
Discuss
Construction of Legal Personnel System], TENGXUN WANG [TENCENT WEB] (Mar. 9, 2006),
http://news.qq.com/a/20060309/001799.htm (describing similar problems in Sichuan).
138. In 2008, the Political and Legislative Affairs committee of the Central Committee of
the CCP issued an opinion urging a change from local to national financing of the courts. See
Zhong Yang Zhgen Fawei Yuanhui Guanyu Shenhua Sifati Zhihe Gongzuo Jigai Geruo
Ganwen Ti De Yi Jian (中央政法委员会关于深化司法体制和工作机制改革若干问题的
意见) [Initial Funding for China‘s Legal System Initially Established], 360 DOC,
http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0421/11/1993767_111229089.shtml (last visited Apr. 8,
2012).
139. See Renmin Fayuan Dierge Wunian Gaige Gongyao (2004–2008)
(人民法院第二个五年改革纲要(2004–2008)) [Supreme People's Court Notification on the
Issue of The Second Five-year Reform Outline of the People's Courts] (promulgated by the
Sup. People‘s Ct., Oct. 26, 2005) 110 SUP. PEOPLE‘S CT. GAZ. 8 (Sup. People‘s Ct. 2005),
available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law.view.asp?id=120832 (last visited Apr. 8,
2012).
140. See Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed Disenchantment”
and the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 783, 784 (2006).
141. Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J.
INT‘L. L. 103, 106 (2006) (―Many petitions . . . are extra-legal appeals for court decisions.‖).
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On June 10, 2011, the Central Committee Legislative Affairs
Bureau posted draft revisions to the Chinese Civil Procedure Code.142
The Chinese Civil Procedure Code was initially promulgated in 1982
for trial implementation, formally enacted in 1991, and most recently
amended in 2007.143 However, the ever increasing number of civil
lawsuits and the over-burdened Chinese trial courts have since led to
discussions of yet another round of changes to the Civil Procedure
Code.144 The 2011 draft amendments are designed to address some of
the country‘s concerns with social instability, the increased workload
of Chinese judges, and the external pressures of a World Trade
Organization (WTO) treaty regime that urges greater access to justice
and greater transparency of the courts.145 Most significantly, the
proposed amendments would codify the multi-track approach to
cases.146
First and foremost, the proposed amendments to the Chinese
Civil Procedure Code would formalize the emphasis on mediation as
an effective mechanism for resolving disputes, noting that ―suitable
cases should first be mediated.‖147 New subsections would also be
added to protect the integrity of mediated agreements.148 Litigants
may apply for enforcement of extra-judicial mediated agreements by
the courts, so long as the agreement is filed with the courts within 30
days of the agreement.149 Under the amended rules, a civil court may,
after investigation, enforce the agreement or require the parties to
mediate again, if it finds the agreement unlawful.150
Along with mediation, the revisions would also make clear that
simplified procedures are to be used for many civil cases in which the

142. Minshi Susong Fa Xiuzhengan (Caoan) Tiaowen ji Caoan Shuoming
(民事诉讼法修正案(草案)条文及草案说明) [Draft Amendment to Chinese Civil
Procedure Code and its Explanations], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc
/xinwen/syxw/2011-10/29/content_1678367.htm [hereinafter 2011 Amendments].
143. Minsufa Xiugai Jianzhi Liudanan (民诉法修改剑指六大难) [Six Major Difficulties
in the Revision of the Civil Procedure Code], NAT‘L PEOPLE‘S CONG. (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/msssfxg/2011-10/26/content_1677140.htm.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
147. 2011 Amendments, supra note 142, para. 25 (inserting a new article as new Article
121).
148. Id. para. 39 (amending Chapter 15 by inserting new Section 6 (Confirming Cases
regarding Mediated Agreements) and Section 7 (Implementing Cases regarding Security
Interests)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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facts are relatively undisputed and the amount in controversy is not
large. One new proposed amendment would require that simple cases
with a value below 5,000 RMB be limited to one trial only. 151 A
second amendment would expand the simplified procedures‘
parameters.152 In addition to requiring some simple cases to use
simplified procedures, parties themselves could agree to the use of
simplified procedures.153 Finally, a third amendment would require
that cases from the basic people‘s court and those sent out from the
trial courts use more convenient methods to summon litigants, deliver
documents, and try cases, but in all cases protect the litigants‘ rights
and opinions.154
Second, responding to the problem of courts refusing to accept
complaints, particularly in difficult and socially significant cases, the
proposed revisions would secure a litigant‘s right to file a complaint
and to present evidence. Drafters of the revisions added a new clause
to Article 111155 which would require a court to accept a filed case
meeting the requirements of Article 118.156 The court‘s decision
whether to accept a case must be made within seven days and
litigants are notified of their right to appeal an adverse decision.157
Similarly, to implement a litigant‘s right to present evidence,
these articles specify the timing and procedure for the receipt of
evidence. Under the proposed amendments, a court must accept the
evidence offered by a party and must record under court seal the type
of evidence presented, the number of pages, the time of receipt, and
the length of the presentation.158 The new amendments also focus on
the pretrial conference, at which the parties would focus on the major
points in dispute, the nature of the evidence to be presented at trial,

151. Id. para. 35 (inserting a new article as new Article 161).
152. Id. para. 33 (changing Article 142 to new Article 156 and inserting a new subsection
in new Article 156 as Subsection (2)).
153. Id.
154. Id. para. 34 (changing Article 144 to new Article 158 and modifying new Article
158).
155. Id. para. 27 (changing Article 112 to new Article 122 and modifying new Article
122).
156. Id. para. 27 (changing Article 112 to new Article 122 and modifying new Article
122).
157. Id.
158. Id. para. 10 (inserting two new articles as new Articles 65 and 66).
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and the identification of points of agreement that would enable the
parties to simplify the trial.159
Third, in lieu of not accepting cases, these proposed articles set
out the process by which Chinese judges would decide in the very
initial stages of the litigation how to track civil cases. The People‘s
Court must assess and track the case to one of the following
possibilities: 1) an expedited procedure (du cu) translated loosely as
―supervised procedure‖ if the case, such as a debt case, has few or no
factual disputes; 2) a mediation, if the litigants‘ disputes are more
substantial; 3) a simplified procedure or ordinary procedure,
according to the needs of the case; and/or 4) a procedure for litigants
to exchange evidence to clarify the points of dispute for cases that
require a trial.160 The goal is that such tracking will leave very few
cases for full adjudication and trial. It is through a multi-tracked
system that litigation will be contained.
As for socially significant cases, the revisions also grapple with a
citizen‘s right to bring these cases with a broader social impact. In
recent years, Chinese courts have discouraged group litigation. In
2006, the All-China Lawyers Association even issued a ―guiding
opinion‖ instructing law firms to assign only ―politically qualified‖
lawyers to cases involving ten or more litigants. Fears of instability
have led courts to withdraw from group litigation. The proposed
procedural revisions, however, recognize the need to expand standing
for public interest cases beyond those who have sustained a direct
injury to include relevant governmental organs and civil society
organizations.161 In consumer protection and environmental cases,
these entities may have standing to file suit on behalf of the public
interest.162 Of course, expanding standing to government agencies
will have the effect of bringing control of such cases back to the
Chinese developmental state, this time as formal parties in
litigation.163

159. Id. para. 25 (inserting a new article as new Art. 121). See explanation 1.1 (Adding a
Provision of Mediation after Register). Id.
160. Id. para. 28 (inserting a new article as new Article 132).
161. Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers Association Regarding Lawyers Handling
Cases of a Mass Nature, CONG.-EXEC. COMM‘N ON CHINA (May 30, 2006),
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=53258 (providing both the
original Chinese and translated English versions).
162. 2011 Amendments, supra note 142, para. 8 (inserting a new article as new Article
55).
163. Id.
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Finally, the new provisions would also expand supervision over
the courts. Prosecutors in China have the unique authority to
supervise judicial work that is distinct from the role of appellate
courts in reviewing cases. The current civil procedure code provides
for one prosecutorial supervision method (kansu) under which an
upper level prosecutor can file a protest with a lower court seeking
retrial (reopening) of a legally effective judgment or with an upper
level court for review if the judgment is not yet legally effective.
Under the proposed amendments, Chinese prosecutors can also
propose a new supervision method (jianyi) under which a prosecutor
would propose to a court at the same level for the retrial of cases with
legally effective judgments, mediated agreements, or arbitration
decisions, so long as there is a newly discovered error, the case meets
Article 198 conditions, or if a mediated agreement harms the public
good.164 Alternatively, the prosecutor could also ask the an upper
level prosecutor to file a kansu.165
The amendments also increase the parameters of supervision. To
address the problem of collusion between litigants and mediation
authorities, a new provision would allow prosecutors to protest
(kansu) or to petition for retrial in the executions of any judgments,
or to challenge any mediated outcome that may harm the public
good.166 The investigative authority of prosecutors would be
increased to allow a prosecutor to investigate whether a protest
(kansu) with the court at the next higher level or a proposal for retrial
(jianyi) to the court at the same level is necessary. 167 The prosecutor
would also be empowered to review court records, question the
litigants, or investigate beyond the case.168 Through these various
amendments, the Chinese state would give itself a role as a litigant
before the court to challenge results it does not like in cases of social
significance.
CONCLUSION
The Chinese Communist Party at its 15th National Congress in
1997 set the first ten-year target for national economic and social
development with a basic strategy of ―governing the country

164.
206).
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. para. 44 (changing Article 187 to new Article 206 and modifying new Article
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 45 (inserting two new articles as Articles 207 and 208).
Id.
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according to law and building a socialist country ruled by law.‖169 By
the end of August 2011, the Chinese legislature had enacted 240
effective laws including the current constitution, 306 administrative
regulations, and over 8,600 local regulations.170 In the areas of court
and legal procedures, Chinese legal reforms adopted some elements
of the adversary system including party autonomy and burdens of
proof.171 But while the language of rights may have been easy to
import, the process of rights assertion has been more difficult. Efforts
to establish legal formality and legal markets in China have led to the
dominance of technocracy and great disparity in access to justice.
Concerns for social stability have led the Chinese state to retreat from
formality and develop a multi-track civil dispute resolution system.
For poor and rural residents, simplified procedures and informal
mediation remain the preferred dispute resolution methods;172 while
litigant autonomy holds sway in the run-of-the-mill commercial
litigation. But in socially significant cases, the Chinese state is
heavily involved—both through greater control of the litigation by
the court and through greater supervision of the courts.
Such a multi-track system, while born of necessity, may serve to
defuse the potential of courts to serve democratic reforms. It follows
from this view that China‘s legal system will focus more on
efficiency than on participation by ordinary citizens, giving more
weight to the state‘s view of justice than to the ordinary litigant.
Indeed, just as China embarked on ―socialism with Chinese
characteristics,‖ we are also witnessing ―rule of law with Chinese
characteristics.‖ And the ―rule of law with Chinese characteristics‖
means a multi-tracked approach to rendering justice—one that
focuses on preserving harmony rather than adjudicating right from
wrong, dispute resolution rather than readjustment of public norms.
And yet, the presence of the Chinese developmental state and
―rule of law with Chinese characteristics‖ is inevitable. Therefore, the
challenge for future legal reformers is to recognize the reality of a
dominant state but work towards ways to incorporate and ensure
169. Establishment of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics, INFO.
OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 27, 2011),
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-10/27/content_23738846.htm.
170. Id.
171. Features of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics, INFO. OFFICE
OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 27, 2011),
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-10/27/content_23738836.htm.
172. See generally CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA, supra note 58.
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citizens‘ voices into Chinese law and governance even within the
structure of the dominant state. There are promising signs, such as in
the area of increasing judicial transparency. The new revisions of the
Civil Procedure Code would require that all judgments and judicial
orders be made public and that the basis for the decision be explained
in writing (New Articles 151, 153, and 155).173 Nevertheless, civil
litigants must be given the freedom and opportunity to shape and
formulate their own civil litigation before civil litigation can truly
serve the democratic role of preserving citizen voices.

173. See 2011 Amendments, supra note 142, para. 32.

